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Denying and Defining Religion Under the First
Amendment: Waldorf Education as a Lens for
Advocating a Broad Definitional Approach
INTRODUCTION
Group eurhythmic dance, biodynamic gardening, handicrafts,
and the search for spiritual enlightenment are not the typical
subjects that elementary and high school students learn in the
classroom. Nevertheless, these topics and others make up a
particular nontraditional curriculum that many parents choose for
their children.1 This pedagogical method, which focuses on
fostering students’ mental, physical, and spiritual health, is
practiced as part of the phenomenon known as Waldorf education.2
Waldorf schools originated from a belief system known as
anthroposophy, which author and spiritual philosopher Rudolf
Steiner created in the early twentieth century.3 Anthroposophy
postulates, among other ideas, the existence of a directly
comprehensible spiritual world and embraces teachings from all
religious faiths.4 Notably, Waldorf education, although most
commonly implemented in private institutions, also exists in
publicly funded settings.5
Although many parents, teachers, administrators, and students
commend the holistic, artistic approach undertaken by public
Waldorf education, a group consisting of parents of former
Waldorf students and certain taxpayers is not so supportive.6 In
fact, this group is the plaintiff in a lawsuit, which alleges that
publicly funded Waldorf education is religious in nature7 and thus
violates the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.8
Representatives and supporters of Waldorf schools, as well as
followers of anthroposophy, forcefully deny this accusation,
asserting that anthroposophy is merely a spiritual philosophy—not
a religion.9 Thus, what actually qualifies as a religion under the
Constitution is central to the resolution of this dispute. Whereas a
Copyright 2012, by MICHAEL RHEA.
1. See discussion infra Part I.B.
2. See discussion infra Part I.B.
3. See discussion infra Part I.A–B.
4. See discussion infra Part I.A.
5. See discussion infra Part I.B.
6. See discussion infra Part I.C.
7. See discussion infra Part I.C.
8. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. See discussion infra Part I.C.
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significant line of cases addresses the issue of defining religion
when a group claims or admits religious status, the Waldorf
controversy provides the uncommon situation in which an entity
denies religiosity.10
The characteristics of the Waldorf paradigm engender interests,
arguments, and legal questions distinct from those germane to the
more commonly litigated Free Exercise and Establishment Clause
fact patterns.11 Specifically, the stakes involved when an entity
asserts or admits its religious nature differ significantly from the
individual and societal concerns in the less common situation in
which a party denies its religious nature.12 Accordingly, these
dissimilarities in interests raise the question of whether a court has
the authority to label a party as religious against its will. Further,
these dissimilarities shed light on how courts should define
religion.
Moreover, contemporary notions of American religious
diversity demand an examination of the legal definition of religion
and suggest that controversies like the Waldorf dispute will appear
in the future in greater numbers and with greater frequency. Such
disputes will likely increase as religious subgroups and even
completely novel religious groups emerge and seek to establish
themselves in the United States.13 Not only do non-Christian
minority religions represent an increasingly large percentage of the
American population, but subgroups within these minority
traditions as well as within Christianity are also multiplying.14
Furthermore, in light of the perceived failure of many traditional
public schools in the United States,15 parents’ and communities’
10. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J.,
concurring); see also infra note 82.
11. See supra note 8. The first clause of the quoted portion of the
amendment is the Establishment Clause; the second is the Free Exercise Clause.
12. See discussion infra Part IV.
13. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
14. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., John Stossel, John Stossel’s “Stupid in America,” How Lack
of Choice Cheats Our Kids Out of a Good Education, ABC NEWS, Jan. 13, 2006,
http://abcnews.go.com/2020/Stossel/story?id=1500338; Lou Dobbs, Dobbs: No
Summer Vacation for Our Failing Schools, CNN, June 27, 2006, http://
articles.cnn.com/2006-06-27/us/dobbs.june28_1_high-school-diploma-dropoutsgraduation-numbers?_s=PM:US; Gilbert Cruz, Can Charter-School Execs Help
Failing Public Schools?, TIME, June 27, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/
nation/article/0,8599,1907203,00.html; Valerie Strauss, An Occasion for Civil
Debate, Constitution Day Questioned as a ‘One-Shot Moment’ in Education,
WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at B02; Robin Finn, Shaping the System That
Grades City Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at 4; Mitchell Landsberg, The
Vanishing Class; Back to Basics: Why Does High School Fail So Many?, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at A1.
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confidence in non-traditional education is on the rise.16 Where nontraditional educational models arising from arguably religious
organizations seek direct financial support from the state, the
potential for Waldorf-like controversies abounds, indicating the
need for a coherent, workable constitutional definition of religion.
In light of the increasingly diverse religious and educational
landscapes in the United States, this Comment contends that the
Waldorf dispute demonstrates why courts should adopt a broad,
unitary definition and be able to apply it in spite of an entity’s
denial of religiosity. Specifically, courts should adopt a definition
that does not apply a “comprehensiveness” requirement but does
incorporate an element focusing on “duties of conscience” in the
mind of an adherent to a belief.17
In reaching this conclusion, Part I of this Comment first
explores the history and current status of anthroposophy, as well as
the Waldorf education program to which Steiner’s philosophy
gives rise. Additionally, Part I examines the Waldorf controversy
in some detail. Next, Part II tracks the jurisprudential development
of the constitutional definition of religion and discusses the
essential failure of the United States Supreme Court in setting forth
a clear, workable definition. Part III distills from past judicial
decisions and scholarly commentary the underlying individual and
societal interests that drive the debate about defining religion in
typically observed cases. Part IV explores how the facts of the
Waldorf dispute bring to light interests that have not arisen in
previously decided cases. Ultimately concluding that societal
concerns outweigh individual concerns in the Waldorf scenario,
Part IV also suggests that courts have the authority to impose a
religious label on an entity that denies its own religiosity. Finally,
acknowledging that the Waldorf scenario implicates a need for a
new definitional framework, Part V presents a forward-looking
solution: an expansive, inclusive definition of religion that
adequately protects the interests entailed in both the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses by reflecting the role of religion in a
pluralistic society.

16. See, e.g., V. Dion Haynes, Teachers, Parents Spend Break Getting New
School Ready for Kids, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1994, at 2; Kate Folmar, Opposites on
Track, 2 Schools in Running for National Blue Ribbon Status, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
12, 1997, at 1; Abby Goodnough, $30 Million Pledged to Help City Revamp
Failing Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at B6; Kameel Stanley, Putting His
Ideals to the Test, School to Focus on Founder’s ‘Smaller Is Better’ Doctrine,
WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2008, at LZ01; Rachel Cromidas, Charter Education
Expanding In Chicago, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, at 21A.
17. See discussion infra Part V.
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I. EXAMINING ANTHROPOSOPHY AND WALDORF EDUCATION
A. Anthroposophy
Anthroposophy, a spiritual philosophy founded by author and
teacher Rudolf Steiner in the early twentieth century, advances the
notion of an objective, comprehensible spiritual world, amenable
to direct experience through internal spiritual cultivation.18
Operating as a method of spiritual study that combines elements of
anthropology and theosophy, anthroposophy aims to attain the
precision, consistency, and coherence characteristic of scientific
investigations of the physical world.19
Particularly, anthroposophy endeavors to observe “the external
nature of the human being living in the sense-perceptible world,”
but in doing so, “seek[s] out the spiritual foundation by means of
its manifestation.”20 The end aim of anthroposophy is to empower
people “to penetrate the mystery of [their] relationship with the
spiritual world by searching for answers and insights that come
through a schooling of one’s inner life.”21 Ultimately,
anthroposophy may be termed succinctly as “spiritual science.”22
Today, over 10,000 institutions worldwide are fundamentally
based on or connected with Steiner’s anthroposophy.23
18. See generally RUDOLF STEINER, THE ESSENTIAL STEINER: BASIC
WRITINGS OF RUDOLF STEINER: KNOWLEDGE, NATURE, AND SPIRIT; SPIRITUAL
ANTHROPOLOGY; HISTORICAL VISION; ESOTERIC CHRISTIANITY; SOCIETY AND
EDUCATION (Robert A. McDermott ed., 1985).
19. Anthropology is defined as “the study of human beings and their
ancestors through time and space and in relation to physical character,
environmental and social relations, and culture.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). Theosophy is defined as a “teaching
about God and the world based on mystical insight.” Id.
20. RUDOLF STEINER, ANTHROPOSOPHY (A FRAGMENT) 84–85 (Catherine E.
Creeger & Detlef Hardorp trans., 1996). Steiner provided a vivid analogy to
describe anthroposophy:
If theosophy could be likened to standing on top of a mountain
surveying the landscape, while anthropology is investigating down in
the lowlands, forest by forest and house by house, then anthroposophy
will choose its vantage point on the slope of the mountain, where
individual details can still be differentiated but integrate themselves to
form a whole.
Id.
21. The Anthrposophical Society in America, ANTHROPOSOPHY.ORG,
http://www.anthroposophy.org/about/about-the-anthroposophical-society.html
(last visited on Feb. 26, 2012).
22. Is Anthroposophy a Religious Faith?, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG,
http://www.waldorfanswers.org/NotReligion2.htm (last visited April 28, 2012).
23. History of the Anthroposophical Society, GOETHEANUM, http://www.
goetheanum.org/121.html?&L=1 (last visited April 28, 2012).
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B. Waldorf Education
Waldorf schools are a product of Steiner’s anthroposophy and
have become increasingly popular internationally, with 2,500
schools in over 60 countries.24 Like Montessori schools and other
non-traditional educational paradigms, Waldorf schools offer a
different approach to education—one that subscribes to
anthroposophy’s inward-looking, free-thinking perspective.25
Indeed, in order “to solve the riddles of existence and to transform
both self and society,” the Waldorf curriculum differs significantly
from other educational plans.26 For example, students in Waldorf
elementary schools do not learn to read until the second grade—
much later than their traditional school counterparts.27
Other examples of Waldorf schools’ distinction from other
schools include strong focuses on expressive dance—termed
“eurhythmy”—artistic development, handwork, crafts, gardening,
natural studies, cooking arts, and storytelling.28 Many of the
history and storytelling components of the Waldorf curriculum
involve the study of holy texts, myths, and creeds from a panoply
of world religions.29 Additionally, with respect to faculty, those
aspiring to teach at Waldorf schools must undergo an extensive
training program in anthroposophy involving Steiner’s most
prominent works.30 Notably, teachers of younger grades remain
with the same students until the students’ eighth year in school.31

24. Waldorf Education, THE WALDORF SCHOOL OF GARDEN CITY,
www.waldorfgarden.org/page.cfm?p=349 (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
25. Adam Housley, Where’s Waldorf?, FOXNEWS LIVE SHOTS (September
15, 2010, 11:21 AM), http://liveshots.blogs.foxnews.com/2010/09/15/whereswaldorf/?action=late-new&order.
26. The Anthroposophical Society in America, ANTHROPOSOPHY.ORG, supra
note 21.
27. Frequently Asked Questions, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, http://www.
waldorfanswers.org/WaldorfFAQ.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
28. RSC Foundations in Anthroposophy, ANTHROPOSOPHY.ORG, http://
www.anthroposophy.org/index.php?id=62&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=259&tx_ttnews
[backPid]=39&cHash=e6744ae40c487b197511023defdb5f0a (last visited Sept.
8, 2010).
29. William Ward, Is Waldorf Education Christian?, WHY WALDORF
WORKS, http://www.whywaldorfworks.org/02_W_Education/documents/2_Is_
W_Christian.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2010).
30. RSC Foundations in Anthroposophy, ANTHROPOSOPHY.ORG, supra note
28. This website also describes the thirty-week program as a “gateway” into the
“profound world-view” of anthroposophy:
Each of us bears three essential questions in her/his heart: “Who am I?
What is my relationship with others? Why am I here on the earth—
what is my mission?” . . . .
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C. The Constitutional Controversy Regarding Waldorf Education
Most Waldorf schools in the United States are private.32
However, to date, 43 are publicly funded—24 of which are in
California.33 Thus, the issue of whether publicly funding Waldorf
schools amounts to an establishment of religion—which is
prohibited by the Establishment Clause—arises around Waldorf
methods and their roots in Steiner’s anthroposophy.34 Although
Waldorf supporters deny any religious or sectarian motive
underlying the schools’ curricula,35 People for Legal and
Nonsectarian Schools (PLANS), a group of concerned parents and
taxpayers, opposes publicly funded Waldorf schools.36 PLANS not
only attacks the quality of the teaching methods used in Waldorf

Only by working with the whole human being—head, heart, and
hands/limbs—can we find meaningful answers to such questions.
“Abstract” knowledge serves only the head, not the heart and hands.
The Foundations in Anthroposophy program balances and interweaves
five educational approaches to self-transformation: study, conversation,
meditation, artistic activity, and skill-development . . . .
....
A gateway into many professions, the Foundations in Anthroposophy
program serves as the first year of Waldorf Teacher Education for those
who wish to become Waldorf school teachers in the Grades, Early
Childhood and High School. It also prepares the student for further
studies in Biodynamic agriculture and horticulture, beekeeping,
remedial education, medicine, the arts of eurhythmy, drama, speech,
painting, sculpture, music, architecture, and social sciences . . . .
Students explore the nature of the human being as body, soul, and
spirit, chart the unfolding of their own biographies, seek the deeper
meaning of life, grasp the laws of karma and reincarnation, and strive
to create new forms through practical work and community building.
The Foundations in Anthroposophy program opens exciting vistas into
the inner laws of nature and spirit, evolution of the Earth and changing
human consciousness, the relationships between East and West, the
mysteries of the Grail, freedom, love and individual creativity, and the
challenges/opportunities facing us in our time . . . .
Id.
31. Frequently Asked Questions, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, supra note 27.
32. Housley, supra note 25.
33. Id.
34. For a law to pass muster under the Establishment Clause, the law must
have a legitimate secular purpose, must not have the primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion, and must not further an excessive entanglement of
government and religion. If it does not pass this test, the law cannot stand. See
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
35. Frequently Asked Questions, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, supra note 27.
36. Welcome from PLANS President, WALDORFCRITICS.ORG, http://www.
waldorfcritics.org/index.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2010).
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classrooms but also objects to the alleged unconstitutionality of
government funding for these schools.37 Specifically, PLANS
argues that state support for Waldorf schools directly violates the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because these
schools are inherently “religious” and deleterious to the separation
of church and state.38 Accordingly, PLANS sued two California
school districts for their official support of Waldorf schools.39
The crux of PLANS’s argument rests in defining
anthroposophy—and Waldorf schools, by extension—as religious
in nature. In its trial brief, PLANS aims to establish the religious
nature of anthroposophy by linking Waldorf schools to the
teachings of Steiner and anthroposophy.40 In doing so, PLANS
aims to show that Waldorf schools constitute “an excessive
governmental entanglement” with religion.41 Furthermore, PLANS
insists that public funding for Waldorf schools is a government
endorsement of religion.42
Other instances of Waldorf schools’ arguably religious nature
are scattered throughout Steiner’s teachings. For example, Steiner
is alleged to have made missionaries of aspiring Waldorf teachers
by instructing them to promote the anthroposophist message to
their students.43 Additionally, Steiner himself specifically referred
to anthroposophy as religious: “[T]he [Anthroposophical] Society
provides religious instruction just as other religious groups do.”44
From her own experience as a parent of a former student, the
President of PLANS describes Waldorf education as a rigid,

37. Melody Gutierrez, Public Waldorf Schools Booming in Sacramento–But
Are They Legal?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Aug. 2, 2010, at 1B.
38. Concerns, WALDORFCRITICS.ORG, http://www.waldorfcritics.org/concerns
.html#public (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
39. Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 1, PLANS, Inc. v. Sacramento City Unified
Sch. Dist., Twin Ridges Elementary Sch. Dist., and Does 1–100, 2005 WL
2657536 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (No. CIV. S 98–266 FCD EFB).
40. Id. at 5–6.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id. at 11–12.
43. RUDOLF STEINER, FACULTY MEETINGS WITH RUDOLF STEINER 55
(Robert Lathe & Nancy Parsons Whittaker trans., 1998). Steiner emphasized:
Among the faculty, we must certainly carry within us the knowledge
that we are not here for our own sakes, but to carry out the divine
cosmic plan. We should always remember that when we do something,
we are actually carrying out the intentions of the gods, that we are, in a
certain sense, the means by which that streaming down from above will
go out into the world.
Id.
44. Id. at 706.
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authoritarian environment immersed in “medieval dogma.”45
Moreover, PLANS criticizes the alleged religious nature of the
material taught in class.46 For example, PLANS emphasizes the inclass celebration of the religious festivals of Michaelmas47 and the
Advent Spiral,48 although Waldorf teachers often change the
names of these festivals.49
Waldorf supporters, however, characterize the PLANS
argument as a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of
Waldorf schools and anthroposophy.50 Although religious study is
often incorporated into a Waldorf school’s curriculum, Waldorf
supporters assert that anthroposophy is not mentioned in the
classroom, that in-class religious study does not favor any
particular religion, and that such study is aimed at providing
natural spiritual growth for students of all faiths.51 Rather than
45. Welcome, WALDORFCRITICS.ORG, http://www.waldorfcritics.org (last
visited Feb. 23, 2012). The PLANS president is Debra Snell. Id.
46. See Concerns, WALDORFCRITICS.ORG, supra note 38. Specifically,
PLANS attacks the alleged religious nature of the class material:
Since 1991 the Waldorf movement has begun to move into public
education in the US [sic] with teacher training workshops, “Waldorf
Method” magnet schools, and “Waldorf-inspired” charter schools . . . .
[T]hese activities have led to violations of church-state separation laws.
The religious philosophy of Anthroposophy cannot be separated from
Waldorf education. For example, Steiner’s scheme of “post-Atlantean
sub-races” is the framework of ancient history taught in all Waldorf
schools, both public and private.
Id.
47. Michaelmas is the Christian celebratory feast of the victory of Michael
the Archangel over Lucifer. See RICHARD FREEMAN JOHNSON, SAINT MICHAEL
THE ARCHANGEL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LEGEND 105–06 (2005).
48. Also called “Winter Garden” or “Advent Garden,” Advent Spiral is a
Waldorf school event that resembles a mystical or religious ritual. See Concerns,
WALDORFCRITICS.ORG, supra note 38.
49. Id.
50. Frequently Asked Questions, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, supra note 27.
51. Id. Waldorf supporters are emphatic in their stance concerning the
religion-neutral nature of Waldorf schools:
Are Waldorf schools religious? Waldorf schools are non-sectarian and
non-denominational. They educate all children, regardless of their
cultural or religious backgrounds. The pedagogical method is
comprehensive, and, as part of its task, seeks to bring about recognition
and understanding of all the world cultures and religions. Waldorf
schools are not part of any church. They espouse no particular religious
doctrine but are based on a belief that there is a spiritual dimension to
the human being and to all of life. Waldorf families come from a broad
spectrum of religious traditions and interest.
Waldorf Education Frequently Asked Questions, WHY WALDORF WORKS,
http://www.whywaldorfworks.org/02_W_Education/faq_about.asp (last visited
Sept. 8, 2010).
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adopting the label “religion,” Waldorf supporters and
anthroposophists see anthroposophy as a complement to religion.52
Anthroposophists claim to embrace ideas from all religions and
focus on spiritual enlightenment.53 Anthroposophy entails no
profession of faith, no sacred texts, no particular method of study,
no proclaimed means of salvation, no religious practices or
sacraments, and no hierarchical spiritual leaders.54 Some Waldorf
supporters even claim that Steiner’s spiritual philosophy cannot be
characterized as a belief system, but should merely be considered a
method of achieving a healthy body, mind, and spirit. 55
Ultimately, the dispute can be characterized as Waldorf
supporters’ word against the allegations of PLANS. But whose
point of view, if either, is the correct one?56 Centering on delicate
issues of faith, education, and the role of religion in American
society, the implications of the Waldorf scenario provide a lens for
examining two exceptionally difficult issues: whether a court has
the authority to impose a religious label on an unwilling entity, and
if so, how courts should define religion under the First
Amendment.
II. TRACKING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
DEFINITION OF RELIGION
Despite the significance of the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses of the Constitution, defining religion remains a herculean
task that the United States Supreme Court has essentially avoided
to date. The Supreme Court’s failure to provide a working legal
52. Is Anthroposophy a Religion?, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, http://www.
waldorfanswers.org/NotReligion1.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2012).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Is Anthroposophy a Religious Faith?, WALDORFANSWERS.ORG, supra
note 22. Steiner’s own commentary distinguishes anthroposophy from religion:
It is often asked how spiritual science or anthroposophy stands in
relation to the religious life of man . . . . By reason of the whole
character of anthroposophy, it will not intervene in any religious creed,
in the sphere of any sort of religious life . . . . Spiritual science never
can entertain the wish to create a religion . . . . One cannot, therefore,
call spiritual science, as such, a religious faith. It neither aims at
creating a religious faith nor in any way at changing a person in relation
to his religious beliefs.
Id.
56. In the most recent episode of this lawsuit, the Eastern District ruled in
favor of the defendant school districts, holding that PLANS failed to show that
anthroposophy is religious in nature. Memorandum and Order at 21, PLANS,
Inc. v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., et al., 2010 WL 6352637 (E.D. Cal.
Nov. 5, 2010) (No. CIV. S 98–266 FCD EFB).
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definition of religion has engendered pervasive uncertainty with
respect to the issue, prompting lower courts and legal scholars to
set forth several definitional approaches.57
A. An Evolving Definition: From a Theistic Approach to Ultimate
Concerns
Although Supreme Court jurisprudence associated with the
constitutional definition of religion is sparse, judicial opinions on
the issue have shifted from adopting a strict, narrow definition of
religion to a sweepingly inclusive definition.58 The history of the
American judicial definition of religion began in 1890 with the
case of Davis v. Beason.59 There, the Supreme Court stated that
“[t]he term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relations
to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for
his being and character, and of obedience to his will.”60 This
theistic, creator-centric definition of religion lasted well into the
early twentieth century, when the Court in United States v.
Macintosh defined the “essence of religion” as a “belief in a
relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation.”61
The first challenge to the predominating theistic definition of
religion originated in Judge Augustus Hand’s appellate court
opinion in United States v. Kauten.62 Rather than adopting a
theistic approach, Judge Hand broadly defined religion as “a belief
finding expression in a conscience which categorically requires the
believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept
martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets.”63 In other
words, Judge Hand developed a definition of religion rooted not
only in a single supernatural paradigm but also in human
relationships and the universe at large.64 Only a year later, in
United States v. Ballard, the Supreme Court embraced Judge
Hand’s approach, defining religion to encompass “theories of life
and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to
followers of the orthodox faiths.”65
See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
See infra notes 59–76 and accompanying text.
133 U.S. 333 (1890).
Id. at 342.
283 U.S. 605, 633–34 (1931).
133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
Id. at 708.
Karen Sandrik, Towards a Modern Definition of Religion, 85 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 561, 565 (2008).
65. 322 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1944).
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
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Accordingly, this jurisprudential progression set the foundation
for a more significant broadening of the definition of religion in
the 1960s. In Torcaso v. Watkins, the Court adopted an approach to
defining religion that transcended the confines of a theistic
definition of religion: “neither [the federal or state government]
can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as
against those religions founded on different beliefs.”66 The Court
even suggested in dicta that non-theistic beliefs like “Buddhism,
Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism, and others” fall
within the definition of religion.67
Subsequently, in interpreting section 6(j) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act of 1948,68 the Court developed
the “ultimate concerns” test for defining religion in United States
v. Seeger69 and Welsh v. United States.70 The ultimate concerns
test, which arises in the conscientious objector context, essentially
consists of one dispositive question to determine whether a person
is a conscientious objector exempt from military service: “[D]oes
the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector
as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly
qualified for the exemption?”71 Answering this question and
granting the conscientious objections in Seeger and Welsh, the
Court analyzed two sub-issues: “whether the beliefs professed by a
registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in [the
objector’s] own scheme of things, religious.”72 The sincerity
inquiry is fact-dependent and determined on a case-by-case basis.73
Notably, the inquiry strictly avoids an examination of whether the
alleged religious beliefs are valid.74 The second part of the test,
however, determines whether the beliefs at issue are universally
important in the life of the objector, such that they “play the role of
a religion and function as a religion.”75 Put differently, the test
66. 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
67. Id. at 495 n.11.
68. 50 U.S.C. app. § 456(j) (1970). Section 6(j) allows exemptions from
military combat training and service by way of an objection rooted in “religious
training and belief.” Id. The concurrences in Seeger and Welsh suggest that the
Constitution was an influence on the Court’s statutory interpretation because the
Court went beyond the plain language of the statute. See Ben Clements, Note,
Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 532, 538 (1989).
69. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
70. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
71. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 184.
72. Id. at 185.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 184.
75. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 339.
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does not examine the content of the belief at issue but instead aims
to determine whether a belief is subjectively identifiable in the
eyes of an adherent as an ultimate, gravely significant concern.76
B. Seeking a Better Approach to Define Religion: Malnak v. Yogi
Torcaso, Seeger, and Welsh, taken together, demonstrate a
modern broadening of the judicial definition of religion beyond the
traditional theistic approach, which centers on man’s relationship
with a creator.77 Specifically, this broadening is characterized as a
“functional” approach, which focuses on the role an idea plays in
an adherent’s life, rather than its content.78 However, what
“religious” really means in a functional sense remains nebulous
and indefinite.79 Moreover, whether religious beliefs are always
equivalent to ultimate concerns is another problematic issue with
this definitional approach. In other words, beliefs that an adherent
might commonly consider religious may or may not function with
such universal importance in an individual’s life that a person
would make immense sacrifices in order to abide by them.80
Thus, because of the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to define
religion clearly, lower courts have sought a more workable
approach for defining religion in the constitutional context.81 A
pertinent example is Malnak v. Yogi, a landmark decision in the
Third Circuit in which the court barred the offering of a high
school course in the Science of Creative Intelligence and
Transcendental Meditation (SCI/TM) on Establishment Clause

76. Id.
77. Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1056, 1066 (1978).
78. John C. Knechtle, If We Don’t Know What It Is, How Do We Know If
It’s Established?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 521, 526 (2003).
79. Steven D. Collier, Beyond Seeger/Welsh: Redefining Religion under the
Constitution, 31 EMORY L.J. 973, 1008–09 (1982).
80. Clements, supra note 68, at 540–41; see also Collier, supra note 79, at
1008–09. For example, although strictly observing the Sabbath likely qualifies
as an ultimate concern for a Russian Jewish sect known as the Subbotniks—
whose name literally means followers of the Sabbath—a less strict Christian or
Jewish tradition might consider resting on the Sabbath as a practice that,
although religious in nature, is not universally important in comparison with
other religious beliefs. See Origins of the Subbotniki Sect, MOLOKANE.ORG,
http://molokane.org/subbotniki/Aldacushion/HTML/3_Origins.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2012). In other words, there may be concerns that, although lacking in
ultimate importance, are nonetheless considered religious in the lives of
adherents.
81. See infra notes 82–104 and accompanying text.
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grounds.82 The plaintiffs argued that the SCI/TM course was
religious in nature and therefore barred from public funding.83
Central to the course was the idea that life is founded in “pure
creative intelligence.”84 Additionally, the Hindu monk directing
the course encouraged students to “perceive the full potential of
their lives” through Transcendental Meditation.85 The practice of
Transcendental Meditation taught in the course included a
ceremonial element known as the “puja,” which involved the
recitation of a “mantra” chosen for each student individually.86 The
puja also included chanting and making offerings to a deified
Hindu teacher.87 Despite the defendants’ contention that the
SCI/TM course was not religious in nature, the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court’s finding88 that the course was indeed of
a religious nature.89 Notably, without referring to or setting forth
any definition of religion, the court simply deemed the SCI/TM
course as religious and violative of the Establishment Clause.90
Unsatisfied with the court’s conclusory classification of the
SCI/TM course as religious, Judge Arlin Adams, in a concurring
opinion, set out a test for defining religion in the constitutional
context.91 Although Judge Adams acknowledged Seeger and
Welsh’s expansion of the definition of religion to include nontheistic belief systems, Judge Adams also found the ultimate
concerns and sincerity inquiries to require further development and
limitation.92 Accordingly, Judge Adams developed a three-factor
test.93 First, ideas or actions of a religious nature should “address
82. 592 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1979). Malnak is one of the only cases in which
an entity has denied it is religious in nature only to be labeled as religious by a
court. Id. at 200 (Adams, J., concurring). Aside from the fact that a particular
course at the high school in Malnak was at issue, rather than an entire teaching
philosophy or paradigm, Malnak mirrors the Waldorf controversy. Id.
Accordingly, the judge in the Waldorf controversy has adopted a standard for
defining religion reflecting the method used in Malnak. See infra note 104.
83. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 197–98.
84. Id. at 198.
85. Id.
86. Id. Pujas, which lasted between one and two hours each, were
conducted off campus on a Sunday. Students were required to bring fruit,
flowers, and a white handkerchief. Id.
87. The deified teacher to whom the chanting and offerings were directed in
the puja is known as “Guru Dev”—the embodiment of kindness and the purest
essence of creation. Id. at 198 n.2.
88. Malnak v. Yogi, 440 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1977).
89. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 198–200 (3d Cir. 1979).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 200–210 (Adams, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 200.
93. See infra notes 94–99 and accompanying text.
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fundamental questions” in the sense expressed in the ultimate
concerns test in Seeger and Welsh.94 Judge Adams emphasized
courts’ duty not to determine the “truth or falsity” of supposed
religions; nonetheless, the test requires the determination of
whether a belief rises to the level of encompassing “theories of
man’s nature or his place in the Universe which characterize
recognized religions.”95
The next two factors provide limits upon the first. Because a
particular ultimate concern may be an isolated idea that deals only
with one or a few aspects of life, the second factor requires that an
idea be part of a “comprehensive belief-system” to be considered
religious.96 For example, Judge Adams referred to the Big Bang
theory as answering an ultimate question, yet failing to encompass
all aspects of life in a complete system of ultimate truth.97 Lastly,
the third factor requires the presence of “formal, external, or
surface signs that may be analogized to accepted religions.”98 For
example, this element consists of “formal services, ceremonial
functions, the existence of clergy, structure and organization,
efforts at propagation, observation of holidays and other similar
manifestations associated with the traditional religions.”99
Thus, Judge Adams provided three factors that now compose
the prevailing test for defining religion. Courts in subsequent cases
have adopted these factors and scholars have treated them as
central to the debate regarding the definition of religion.100 For
example, two years after Malnak, the Third Circuit officially
adopted Judge Adams’s three-factor test in Africa v.
Pennsylvania.101 In addition, the Tenth Circuit adopted and
modified Judge Adams’s test in United States v. Meyers,102 which
94. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 208 (Adams, J., concurring).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 209.
97. Id. at 208–09.
98. Id. at 209.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., Collier, supra note 79, at 991–97; Clements, supra note 68, at
552–53; Sandrik, supra note 64, at 568–69.
101. 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981) (denying prisoner’s petition for injunction
requiring state prison authority to provide for special religious dietary needs and
holding that prisoner’s organization—which required a raw food diet and an
opposition to all that is wrong, and consisted of no formal hierarchy or
ceremonies—was not religious, insofar as the organization did not address
fundamental and ultimate questions, was not comprehensive in nature, and did
not have external or formal signs characteristic of traditional religions).
102. 95 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1996) (setting out five factors for determining
whether an idea or organization is religious: ultimate ideas, metaphysical beliefs,
moral or ethical systems, comprehensiveness of beliefs, and accoutrements of
religion).
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provided the standard for the District Court of New Mexico in
United States v. Quaintance.103 Furthermore, the parties to the
Waldorf controversy have relied upon Judge Adams’s concurrence
in Malnak as an appropriate standard for resolving the Waldorf
controversy.104 Thus, at the least, Judge Adams’s test is gaining
popularity as an appropriate way to define religion for the purposes
of the First Amendment.
III. DISTILLING THE INTERESTS THAT DRIVE THE DEBATE ABOUT
THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION
The Supreme Court’s failure to develop an unambiguous
constitutional definition of religion signifies an uncommonly
volatile area of American constitutional law.105 Whereas courts
have defined other concepts in the Constitution, religion is
relatively uncharted territory. The varying judicial and scholarly
opinions suggesting an appropriate method for defining religion
are rooted in the struggle between competing individual and
societal interests.106 For example, in most cases involving the
religion clauses of the Constitution, individual interests like
freedom of conscience, self-determination, and avoidance of
psychological trauma are pitted against society’s interests in
avoiding political discord and unnecessary cost and maintaining a
separation of church and state.107
Whereas advocates of a broad definition of religion usually
focus on the individual concerns at stake, scholars and judges
seeking to rein in the definition of religion typically do so with the
interests of ordered liberty and society at large in mind.108 For
example, when an individual conscientiously objects on the basis
of a borderline religious belief, he or she has an interest in a broad
definition of religion that sweeps widely in its ambit of
protection.109 Conversely, the government may have an interest in
a narrower definition of religion that allows the state to legislate

103. 471 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (D.N.M. 2006) (finding that beliefs of members of
the “Church of Cognizance” that marijuana was a sacrament and deity and that
consumption of marijuana was a means of worship were not “religious” for the
purposes of free exercise).
104. See Trial Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 39, at 9–10.
105. Collier, supra note 79, at 976.
106. See discussion infra Part III.A–B.
107. James G. Dwyer, School Vouchers: Inviting The Public into the
Religious Square, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 963, 966 (2001).
108. See discussion infra Part III.A–B.
109. See discussion infra Part III.A.
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and enforce laws it views as valuable to society without the
interference of the Free Exercise Clause.110
A. Protecting Individual Interests
Serving as the fountainhead of the modern broadening of the
definition of religion beyond theism, Torcaso v. Watkins resulted
in the Supreme Court’s invalidation of a Maryland constitutional
provision that required state officials to profess a belief in God.111
Particularly, the Court held that Maryland’s oath requirement
“unconstitutionally invade[d] the [declining official’s] freedom of
belief and religion.”112 In other words, the Court’s decision in
Torcaso explicitly rejected a purely theistic definition of
religion.113 In doing so, the Court concerned itself with the
potential “burdens imposed on the free exercise of the faiths of
nonfavored believers.”114 Indeed, the Court in Torcaso reinforced
the scholar-supported notion that “[t]he core of the free exercise
clause is voluntarism—the inviolability of conscience.”115
Accordingly, the thrust of the Torcaso decision appears to emanate
from the notion of defending individual citizens from the harmful
psychological turmoil of having to feign or alter religious beliefs in
order to avoid punishment or obtain a benefit from the state.116
Notably, although the Torcaso decision marked the Court’s
willingness to recognize the important moral and psychological
interests an individual has in the security of his conscience, it did
so without having to account for any significant competing state

110. See discussion infra Part III.B. In a case in which the Establishment
Clause is central, the interests are reversed. The government may desire a broad
definition of religion to control religious influence in state affairs, whereas an
individual entity may seek a narrower definition in order to escape the
limitations of the Establishment Clause. Id.
111. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). At issue in Torcaso was article 37 of the
Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution: “‘[N]o religious test ought
ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State,
other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God . . . .’” Id. at 489.
112. Id. at 496.
113. See Note, supra note 77, at 1066.
114. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490.
115. See Note, supra note 77, at 1058.
116. Clements, supra note 68, at 545; Dwyer, supra note 107, at 970–71; J.
Morris Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327,
337 (1969); Gary J. Simson, Endangering Religious Liberty, 84 CAL. L. REV.
441, 466–67 (1996); Brian M. Murray, Confronting Religion: Veiled Muslim
Witnesses and the Confrontation Clause, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1743
(2010).
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interest.117 Rather, the Court struck down an arcane provision of
the Maryland Constitution that, although originally drafted soon
after colonists emigrated to “escape religious test oaths and
declarations” they had faced in Europe,118 was subsequently
abused by religious majorities to oppress “dissenters from their
faith.”119 This brief dismissal of the Maryland provision, coupled
with the glaring absence of any mention of Maryland’s interest in
upholding the requirement that officials express a belief in God,
indicates that the Court considered the individual interests at stake
in the case as prevailing over comparatively minimal, or even nonexistent, legitimate state interests.120 In other words, broadening
the definition of religion and connoting the break from a line of
narrow, theistic jurisprudence was relatively easy for the Court in
Torcaso, in which the state lacked any significant interest in
enforcing the particular provision.
However, a few years later in the Seeger and Welsh decisions,
the Court encountered more formidable societal interests, which
required a more careful balancing against individual interests.121
Summarized succinctly, the federal government had an incentive to
prevent the circumvention of the draft through the abuse of a
statutory exemption for conscientious objectors.122 Moreover,
although all governments have a significant interest in ensuring the
enforcement of laws in general, the federal government in Seeger
and Welsh had compelling and particularized interests in
effectively enforcing the law to provide for national security,
defense, and public order.123 Expressed differently, in Seeger and
Welsh, the individual interest in avoiding the dilemma of
disobeying the law or facing “extratemporal consequences” was
pitted against strong societal interests in maintaining the meaning
and applicability of law, as well as in providing for public
safety.124
117. In Torcaso, the Court channeled Justice Black: “Neither [a state nor the
Federal Government] can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in
any religion.” 367 U.S. at 492–93 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
15–16 (1947)).
118. Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 490.
119. Id.
120. See id.
121. See discussion infra Part III.B.
122. See generally Clark, supra note 116 (describing the interplay between
individual interests in religious freedom and governmental interests in health,
safety, order, defense, and revenue).
123. Id.
124. Simson, supra note 116, at 446.
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Despite the government’s interest in curtailing the breadth of
the definition of religion in the Seeger and Welsh cases, the Court
allowed the conscientious objection, indicating that individual
interests in freedom of conscience and of religion are to be
protected as sacred even in the face of important state policies.125
In turn, the ultimate concerns test was born.126 Accordingly, with
this precedent in mind, advocates of the psychological interests
connected with the Free Exercise Clause promote broadly inclusive
definitions of religion.127 Expanding upon the individual
psychological and conscience-based concerns that are central to the
policy behind a broad definition of religion, commentators
advocating broad definitions emphasize other more particularized
concerns about morality and fairness, which come under the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause.128 For example, “the cost to
a principled individual of failing to do his moral duty is generally
severe, in terms of supernatural sanction or the loss of moral selfrespect.”129 Additionally, broad definitions also aim to protect
interests in privacy, independence, self-expression, and
maintaining the integrity of religion against state interference.130
B. Protecting Societal Interests
The Supreme Court’s development of the ultimate concerns
test in Seeger and Welsh, which provided a distinctly broad
definition of religion, has drawn the critical eye of judges and
commentators.131 The expansive ultimate concerns approach
promulgated in Seeger and Welsh has been criticized as useless,
subject to abuse, limitless, and generally unworkable.132 These
criticisms tend to relate to society’s countervailing interests in
religion clause cases, particularly in avoiding the circumvention of
generally applicable laws by individuals who are empowered to
125. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 68–76 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 116; A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., Defining
Religion in Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968);
Anita Bowser, Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A Classification
Problem, 11 VAL. U. L. REV. 163 (1977).
128. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
129. Clark, supra note 116, at 337.
130. Bowser, supra note 127, at 198–201.
131. See infra notes 132–139 and accompanying text.
132. Collier, supra note 79, at 1000; Knechtle, supra note 78, at 527–31;
László Blutman, In Search of a Legal Definition of Religion: Lessons from U.S.
Federal Jurisprudence, Americana: E-Journal of American Studies in Hungary,
Spring 2009, http://americanaejournal.hu/vol5no1/blutman.
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define religion themselves.133 Permitting individuals to define
religion themselves arguably allows the fox to guard the henhouse,
threatening to render the religion clauses objectively
meaningless.134 Furthermore, the ultimate concerns test imposes an
immense burden upon the state in sifting the fraudulent abusers
from the sincere believers.135
Correspondingly, post-Seeger and post-Welsh, allowing
individuals and organizations to be laws unto themselves indicates
a need to limit the ultimate concerns test. For example, Judge
Adams’s concurrence in Malnak deftly limited the apparent
breadth of the Torcaso, Seeger, and Welsh notions of religion by
characterizing religious ideas as part of a “comprehensive belief
system laying a claim to ultimate truth and supported by a formal
group with religious trappings.”136 Judge Adams’s motivation to
give tangible limits to the definition of religion further manifested
itself in the opinion he authored for Africa v. Pennsylvania, in
which the Third Circuit officially adopted Judge Adams’s threepart test.137
By the same token, other societal concerns distinct from the
state’s interest in preventing the circumvention of the law
undergird jurisprudence and scholarly commentary partial to a
more limited definition of religion. One prominent societal concern
hinges upon the perceived overinclusiveness of the ultimate
concerns test: the test—interpreted at its broadest application—
threatens to invalidate any legislation with a humanitarian
133. Blutman, supra note 132; see also Empl. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (holding that neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment).
134. Blutman, supra note 132. However, fears of fraud and abuse are
arguably overdrawn because religious ideas are of such importance that
individuals will not lie about them in a way that would cheapen ideas central to
their lives. Note, supra note 77, at 1081–82. Moreover, the sincerity test is
arguably competent to identify fraud efficiently. Id. See also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) ( “A way of life, however virtuous and
admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of
education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection
of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief. Although
a determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice entitled to
constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept
of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on
matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.”).
135. Clark, supra note 116, at 335.
136. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J.,
concurring). In other words, Judge Adams set out a three-part test encompassing
ultimate concerns, comprehensiveness, and external signs characteristic of
accepted religions. Id. at 208–09.
137. 662 F.2d 1025, 1032 (3d Cir. 1981).
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objective as an establishment of religion.138 From a broader social
perspective, government has a strong interest in avoiding excessive
cost and intense political discord, which prevent the state from
handling issues more pressing than the mediation of religious
controversies under either the Free Exercise Clause or
Establishment Clause.139
C. Dual Versus Unitary Definitional Approaches
Noting the competing interests and approaches for defining
religion, Judge Adams’s concurrence in Malnak also calls attention
to the tug-of-war between the different values associated with the
Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause. Judge Adams
acknowledges but dismisses the scholarly promotion of a dual
definition of religion—a different definition for each clause that is
sensitive to the balance of competing values.140 Particularly, a dual
definitional method would impose a broad definition for the Free
Exercise Clause to protect the array of individual interests, whereas
a narrow definition would attach to the Establishment Clause for
the protection of societal interests.141 Although this approach
purports to resolve the tension between the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause, it is susceptible to criticism that the
language of the First Amendment requires the adoption of a unitary
definition of religion.142 Furthermore, with a dual definitional
138. See Note, supra note 77, at 1084; Knechtle, supra note 78, at 528;
Simson, supra note 116, at 471. For example, increasing funding for education
in impoverished areas might fail under the Establishment Clause as an
establishment of religion if the important goal of improving poor children’s
education qualifies as an ultimate concern.
139. Simson, supra note 116, at 467; see also Patrick M. Garry, The
Democratic Aspect of the Establishment Clause: A Refutation of the Argument
that the Clause Serves to Protect Religious or Nonreligious Minorities, 59
MERCER L. REV. 595, 608–09 (2008).
140. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 210–13 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
141. See Note, supra note 77, at 1084; Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1991).
142. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 210–13 (Adams, J., concurring); Blutman, supra
note 132; Collier, supra note 79, at 993–94. Consider Justice Rutledge’s
criticism of a dual definitional approach in Everson v. Board of Education:
“Religion” appears only once in the Amendment. But the word governs
two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have two
meanings, one narrow to forbid “an establishment” and another, much
broader, for securing “the free exercise thereof.” “Thereof” brings
down “religion” with its entire and exact content, no more and no less,
from the first into the second guaranty, so that Congress and now the
states are as broadly restricted concerning the one as they are regarding
the other.
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approach, particularly positioned individuals or organizations
would receive disparate treatment under each religion clause. For
example, a group might be considered religious under the Free
Exercise Clause but not under the Establishment Clause, allowing
it to garner the benefits but avoid the restrictions the Constitution
applies to religions.143
Ultimately, the struggle to fill the definitional void for religion
in the constitutional context is characterized by the broad and the
narrow, the individual and the societal, the unitary and the dual.
The different values at stake drive the debate: individual interests
in preserving freedom of conscience and expression, avoiding
psychological turmoil, maintaining the integrity of religion,
avoiding punishment or detriment at the hands of the state, and
fulfilling moral duties are pitted against societal interests in
preventing the circumvention of the law, maintaining a separation
between church and state, avoiding excessive expense in delicate
religious controversies like the Waldorf scenario, and preserving
useful legislation from attacks on religious grounds.144 In the
context of this struggle, the Waldorf dispute provides an
opportunity for courts to rethink the current method for defining
religion, particularly through a close examination of the interests,
questions, and challenges that the Waldorf scenario presents.
IV. FRAMING THE INTERESTS AT STAKE IN THE WALDORF
PARADIGM
A. Unearthing a Hidden Set of Interests
The Waldorf situation, which arises under the Establishment
Clause in the educational context, defies the typically observed
balance of interests, in which an individual entity prefers a broad
definition of religion, and the government prefers a narrower
approach.145 In fact, in the Waldorf scenario, the desired approach
for both sides is reversed—with the individual interests of Waldorf
supporters better served by a narrow definition of religion and the
government’s interests protected by a broad definition.146 Although
330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
143. Collier, supra note 79, at 994. For example, this inconsistency would
occur if Waldorf schools avoid a religious classification in the current dispute
but later seek Free Exercise protection as religious entities in the future.
144. See discussion supra Part III.A–B.
145. Cf. discussion supra Part III.A–B.
146. In other words, Waldorf supporters seek a narrower definition of
religion in order to avoid a religious classification, whereas significant societal
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rarely examined as central to an Establishment Clause case in the
educational context, the reasons for an individual’s preference for a
narrow definition and the government’s preference for a broad
definition have always existed latently when an educational
program or practice faces an Establishment Clause challenge.147
Nonetheless, because Establishment Clause cases in the
educational context have commonly involved groups, practices, or
symbols that are clearly religious—such that their religious nature
is beyond debate—these cases have not addressed the definition of
religion or the interests relevant thereto.148 That is to say, no
clearly established religious defendant has been able to argue
sincerely that it is not religious for the purposes of the
Establishment Clause.149 In the Waldorf scenario, however,
Waldorf supporters and anthroposophists are not like clearly
established religious groups and can make the argument that they
are not religious in nature. For example, Waldorf supporters might
assert that the celebrations of Michaelmas and the Advent Spiral
are part of a spiritual-educational approach that goes beyond
religion, unlike a traditional Christian school paradigm that has a
clearly religious agenda.150 Thus, anthroposophists and Waldorf
supporters seek a narrower definition of religion, deny religiosity,
and avoid the limitations of the Establishment Clause.
Because a Waldorf-like defendant has the legitimate
opportunity to deny its own religiosity under the Establishment
Clause, and because the state has significant interests in a dispute

interests favor a broad definition that labels Waldorf schools and anthroposophy
as religious. See discussion supra Parts I.C, III.
147. See infra note 148.
148. For example, the following Establishment Clause cases addressed
whether a particular practice, program, or law constituted an establishment of an
accepted religion—not whether the underlying system of beliefs giving rise to
the alleged establishment was religious in nature: Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677 (2005); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Aguilar v. Felton
473 U.S. 402 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981);
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977);
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
149. See cases cited supra note 148.
150. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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like the Waldorf scenario, a court should have the authority to
define a group or individual as religious, even if the group or
individual denies its religiosity. Moreover, such judicial authority
is particularly important in light of the increased probability of
Waldorf-like disputes arising in the future.151 In light of the
implications of the Waldorf scenario, two related policy arguments
favor the court’s authority to impose a religious label on a
denier.152
B. Waiver of Religious Interests
The first argument is relatively uncomplicated, although
controversial: in the Waldorf situation, wherein an entity denies its
religiosity, such a denial serves as a waiver of any religious rights
or interests normally contemplated in a religion clause case. In
other words, a denial of religious status may be viewed as a waiver
of the benefits of a religious classification.153 Additionally, in spite
of this waiver of religious interests, a court may nonetheless label
an entity as religious in light of society’s heightened countervailing
interests in preventing indoctrination, fraud, and a mixing of
church and state.154 The rationale is that individual religious
interests no longer stand in opposition to the state’s powerful
interests.155 This view is consistent with the idea that individuals or
groups should not be able to self-define for the purposes of the
law, even if, as in this type of case, religiosity is not purported but
instead denied.156
The waiver argument leads to a peculiar result, however.
Indeed, it allows the denier of religiosity to create a dual definition
of religion by its own accord, albeit the complete opposite of what
advocates of a dual definition suggest.157 Whereas the literature
focuses on a narrow definition for the Establishment Clause and a
broad definition for the Free Exercise Clause,158 this “waiver”
approach results in a group falling outside of the definition of
151. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
152. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
153. For a discussion of some of the interests that a religious classification
protects, see supra Part III.A.
154. See discussion supra Part III.B
155. See discussion supra Part III.A–B. For example, in denying the
religiosity of anthroposophy and Waldorf education, Waldorf supporters would
waive any potentially religious interests under this theory. Nonetheless, a court,
in order to protect powerful societal interests, might accept the arguments
PLANS makes, finding anthroposophy and Waldorf schools to be religious.
156. See supra notes 133–135 and accompanying text.
157. See discussion supra Part III.C and accompanying text.
158. See discussion supra Part III.A–B.
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religion for the purposes of the Free Exercise Clause but inside the
definition for the purposes of the Establishment Clause.
Admittedly, this result is vulnerable to the criticism that the
government cannot “have its cake and eat it, too.” If a court
classifies a group or individual as religious, it should not only take
into account government and societal interests that exist in a
religious context, but, in fairness, it should also consider the
interests a group or individual necessarily has as a religious entity.
In other words, if a court determines that a group or individual is
religious against that entity’s will, the court should recognize both
the limitations and benefits that result from a religious
characterization.159
Moreover, the waiver view is open to the criticism that it
allows the state to take unfair advantage of the subtle differences
between the commonly understood meaning of religion and the
legal definition of religion, which, in its current state, is a broader
concept than the former.160 For example, the Jehovah’s Witnesses,
who claim that all religion is “wrong,” “a snare,” and “a racket,”161
would likely qualify as constitutionally religious under the
prevailing judicial tests and scholarly suggestions for defining
religion.162 Essentially, in a situation like the Waldorf controversy,
the waiver argument allows the state to apply the broader legal
definition in the Establishment Clause context and the narrower
operational definition in the free exercise context—both for the
state’s own advantage.163
159. See discussion supra Part III.
160. Boyan, supra note 127, at 490–91. Boyan even posits that the
government should have no power to label as religious an entity that defines
itself as non-religious:
To what extent should it be legally relevant that an individual or group
labels or refuses to label a particular belief as religious? It is most
relevant. A refusal to label a belief as religious, while in a legal context
asserting a freedom or privilege granted on the basis of religion, seems
inconsistent although it is not unknown. Under the standard proposed
here, a court should be required to make clear to the claimant what it
means by religion, because he might understand the term only in a
conventional institutional sense. However, if an individual maintains
that his belief, even including a belief in God, is not religious, it is not
for the government to say that it is.
Id.
161. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 167 (1943) (quoting a
phonographic record Jehovah’s Witnesses played for house inhabitants during
door-to-door information dissemination campaigns).
162. Boyan, supra note 127, at 491 n.47.
163. See id.; see also Note, supra note 77, at 1088. Notably, anthroposophists
and supporters of Waldorf schools deny their religious nature, even under the
broader legal concept of religion in some respects. See supra notes 33–38. Thus,
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C. Balancing Individual and Societal Interests
Notwithstanding the waiver argument’s potential weaknesses, a
second argument demonstrates the superiority of the state’s
interests over the interests of the anthroposophists and Waldorf
supporters in the current controversy. It initially proceeds by
indicating the particular societal interests at stake and weighs them
against the comparatively inferior, less compelling individual
interests of the Waldorf schools.
In a typical conscientious objection claim, the objector’s
interest in individual freedom and psychological well-being is
usually pitted against the state’s comparably formidable interest in
enforcing whichever law is alleged to violate the Free Exercise
Clause. In such a case, the state aims, inter alia, to guard against
fraudulent adherents to a religion in order to prevent abuse of the
Free Exercise Clause and circumvention of the law.164 Likewise, in
the Waldorf situation, the government has a significant interest in
preventing fraudulent denials of religiosity in order to prevent
circumvention of the Establishment Clause.165
Nonetheless, there is a key difference between these two
situations, with respect to the magnitude of the individual interests
at stake. In the conscientious objection fact pattern, the state’s
interests are at odds with formidable individual interests that are of
arguably equal or greater strength.166 Conversely, in a Waldorf-like
fact pattern there exist compelling societal concerns against which
no counterbalancing individual interests of comparable magnitude
emerge.167
Critical among the state’s concerns is preventing the
fraudulent—or at least injurious—circumvention of the
Establishment Clause by a religious group that claims it is not
religious.168 Allowing such a group to avoid an Establishment
Clause challenge opens the door to state-funded religious
indoctrination in an educational setting, the blurring of the line
between church and state, and the incitement of political discord like

because anthroposophy can be distinguished from the Jehovah’s Witness
example, the waiver approach arguably maintains its validity in the Waldorf
scenario, in which the denier of religiosity is aware of the differences between
the legal and commonplace definitions of religion.
164. Collier, supra note 79, at 990.
165. See discussion supra Part III.B.
166. See discussion supra Part III.
167. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
168. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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the Waldorf controversy.169 The primary thrust of this interestbalancing argument rests on a modification of the notion that
allowing individuals to be a law unto themselves threatens to render
the Free Exercise Clause limitless.170 In the Waldorf situation,
however, it is the Establishment Clause that is at risk of superfluity
if a group is granted the power to define itself legally as nonreligious.171 Furthermore, the state has an interest in avoiding costs
and efficiently monitoring borderline cases like the Waldorf dispute
to prevent Establishment Clause violations from occurring.172
In sum, the state and the society it represents have powerful
interests under the Establishment Clause in thoroughly and fairly
vetting the veracity of the claim that public Waldorf schools are
not religious in nature. Necessarily, these interests weigh in favor
of allowing judicial discretion to determine whether entities like
Waldorf schools are religious, despite their contentions to the
contrary.
On the other side of the interests equation, however, free
exercise concerns for fairness to the individual, freedom of
conscience, and the avoidance of psychological harm are not
central to the debate in the Waldorf situation. The moral dilemma
facing an individual entity that must choose between following the
law or its religion is not present in the Waldorf paradigm, wherein
religious nature is explicitly disavowed.173 Assuredly, there is no
danger of duress upon one’s conscience, against which the Free
Exercise Clause protects. Moreover, to declare that there exists a
fundamental right to receive public funding for a particular
teaching method is questionable at best.174 Adherents to
anthroposophy are not at risk of undue governmental interference
with the practice of their spiritual philosophy either. Indeed,
defining anthroposophy as a religion under the Establishment
169. See discussion supra Part I.C.
170. See discussion supra Part III.B.
171. For example, if Waldorf schools or other similar borderline religious
entities escape a religious classification through their own self-definition, the
deferential judicial imprimatur on these entities might sanction the public
funding of activities that even more clearly exhibit a “religious” character, like
constructing facilities for ceremonies or rituals. In other words, by accepting an
entity’s self-proclaimed label of non-religious, a court opens the door for such
an entity to inject even more religious behavior into the classroom under the
guise of its now judicially sanctioned classification as non-religious.
172. See id.
173. See discussion supra Part III.A.
174. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (determining
that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, individuals have only negative fundamental rights and that
the government owes no related positive duties to individuals).
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Clause would remove only Waldorf schools’ eligibility for public
funding.175
To be sure, important individual interests are at stake in a
Waldorf fact pattern, but they do not rise to the level of society’s
interests in upholding the Establishment Clause. For example,
Waldorf schools maintain concerns about self-determination, selfdefinition, and the ability to educate children in a manner that
many believe is beneficial to students’ minds, bodies, and
spirits.176 Moreover, Waldorf schools may also have a strong
interest in avoiding the government-sanctioned cheapening of their
teaching methods through a religious classification.177 In other
words, Waldorf supporters insist that the allegedly religious
characteristics of the Waldorf method are either historical or purely
spiritual in nature.178 A religious label may undercut Waldorf
supporters’ apparently firm belief in neutrality and secularity as
touchstones of Waldorf education’s quality.179 Nonetheless, in this
scenario, an allegedly religious entity’s values do not come under
the special protection of the Free Exercise Clause and are nonissues in the Waldorf paradigm. Thus, in short, a court should have
the power to define ideas and systems like anthroposophy and
Waldorf schools as religious in light of compelling societal
concerns, despite a denial to the contrary.
V. ADOPTING A BROAD, UNITARY DEFINITION OF RELIGION
The societal interests at stake in the Waldorf controversy tip
the scales in the government’s favor, preventing anthroposophists
from legally defining themselves as non-religious and instead
demanding the recognition of a judge’s capability to define
anthroposophy as religious under appropriate circumstances. How
courts should define religion in light of these interests, however, is
a different issue. The balance of interests in the Waldorf
controversy provides critical insight into solving this issue and
suggests a new framework for defining religion. Moreover, the
Waldorf situation’s relevance to an increasingly pluralistic society
demonstrates a need for a definition of religion that differs in
dimension from the currently prevailing Malnak test.180 In light of
175. See supra note 34.
176. See discussion supra Part I.B.
177. Bowser, supra note 127, at 198–201.
178. See discussion supra Part I.B–C.
179. See discussion supra Part I.B–C.
180. Statistics, THE PLURALISM PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY, http://
pluralism.org/resources/statistics/index.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2010). Harvard
University’s Pluralism Project provides statistical and substantive information

1122

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

these considerations, a broad, inclusive definition, if applied
unitarily and with proper limitation, fairly and symmetrically
protects individual and societal values. Specifically, this unitary
definition should avoid a “comprehensiveness” requirement and
should incorporate a non-determinative “duties of conscience”
requirement as well as a non-determinative “external signs”
requirement.
A. Equity of a Unitary Approach
Coupled with the increasing likelihood of Waldorf-like
scenarios in the future, the powerful societal interests at stake in
the Waldorf paradigm bolster the argument for a broad, unitary
definition of religion.181 Whereas the promotion of an expansive
definition is usually premised on achieving protection of individual
interests, a broad, unitary definition of religion also prevents
circumvention of the wall between church and state in Waldorf-

on religious diversity in the United States. Id. The Project emphasizes the
difficulty in gathering accurate statistics regarding the representation of various
religious traditions in the United States:
One of the most frequently asked questions at the Pluralism Project is
about statistics—how many people are here from a given religious
tradition, how many centers are there, what percentage of the
population are we talking about. There is a paucity of information since
the U.S. Census does not collect figures on religious adherence for the
country. What information we have about such numbers is
controversial; some suggest that a religious tradition that keeps track of
its own adherents has a vested interest in maximizing those numbers.
The presence of religious diversity does not require proof; it is a fact
that can be seen in communities across America.
Id. Nonetheless, the Project does suggest increasing diversity and growth in
specific faiths for which information is available, like Baha’is, Buddhists, and
Jains. Id. In addition, the Project indicates that 17 million people—over 6% of
the American population—practices a non-Christian minority religion. Id. For a
more in-depth division of the American population by religious tradition, see
Statistics by Tradition, THE PLURALISM PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
http://pluralism.org/resources/statistics/tradition.php#Total%20Population (last
visited Oct. 12, 2010). Other sources paint a similar picture: the Pew Forum on
Religion and Public Life, in its U.S. Religious Landscape Survey, indicates
results similar to those of the Pluralism Project and describes American society
as a “very competitive religious marketplace,” characterized by “constant
movement” in which “every major religious group is simultaneously gaining and
losing adherents.” Reports, THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S.
RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY, http://religions.pewforum.org/reports (last
visited Oct. 12, 2010).
181. See discussion supra Part III.B–C.
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like situations, providing clarity for the meaning of the
Establishment Clause.182
In other words, whereas less-known religious groups are
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Waldorf situation
indicates a related need to include these groups in the ambit of the
Establishment Clause. This way, symmetry is achieved between
both religion clauses, and a religion receives equal treatment in
both contexts. Moreover, the Establishment Clause’s historically
societal objectives are best achieved under a broad definition of
religion that serves the needs of a religiously pluralistic society.183
Ultimately, the existence and probable proliferation of Waldorflike controversies reinforce the argument for a broad, inclusive
definition of religion.
B. Crafting a Workable Definition of Religion
1. Dropping Malnak’s “Comprehensiveness” Requirement
Judge Adams was aware of the unusual scheme of interests at
issue in Malnak and recognized the importance of developing and
applying an expansive yet prudently limited definition of
religion.184 In turn, Judge Adams crafted the three-part ultimate
concerns, comprehensiveness, and external characteristics test.185
Nonetheless, Judge Adams’s test does not escape criticism and
should be modified in order to develop a workable definition of
religion that reflects the needs and characteristics of modern
American society.186
Judge Adams’s approach is susceptible to the criticism that
comprehensiveness is not a necessary component of a religion.187
Indeed, the comprehensiveness component classifies as nonreligious “a person who worships the sun” or a pantheist, “whose
belief system consists simply of the notion that God exists solely in
nature, and whose beliefs guide him to lead a pure and natural
life.”188 These examples would likely be considered religious from
a common, everyday perspective; in turn, the broader definition
that Judge Adams claims to adopt should not exclude them.189 In
addition, this element of the three-part test is inherently vague,
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See discussion supra Part III.B–C.
See Garry, supra note 139, at 596–99.
See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
Austin, supra note 141, at 23–24.
Id. at 25.
Id.
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insofar as the concept of comprehensiveness may vary
significantly among individuals.190 Moreover, persons not
articulate enough to convey the comprehensiveness of their ideas
might become objects of unfair discrimination in court.191
Waldorf education provides another example of the
arbitrariness of the comprehensiveness standard.192 Although
anthroposophy and Waldorf education may be considered
comprehensive under Judge Adams’s approach, in light of their
mental, spiritual, and physical focuses, they may instead be
considered to fall below the comprehensiveness threshold.193 To be
sure, anthroposophy and Waldorf education arguably center merely
on health issues, albeit mental, physical, and spiritual health.194
Nonetheless, PLANS makes other legitimate arguments beyond
comprehensiveness that advocate for a finding of religiosity,
emphasizing anthroposophy’s attention to theistic and ultimate
concerns and its exhibition of formal external signs of a religious
character.195 Accordingly, because it is both arbitrary and
unnecessary, the comprehensiveness requirement should be
eliminated from the test.
2. Modifying “Ultimate Concerns” to Reflect “Duties of
Conscience”
In addition to eliminating the comprehensiveness requirement,
a modification of the first Malnak factor to reflect “duties of
conscience” will more accurately capture the role of religion in an
individual’s life, as well as in society.196 For example, in Seeger
and Welsh, the Supreme Court intended for the ultimate concerns
test to express the functional role of religion in an adherent’s life—
the place an idea holds, rather than its content.197 The Court
required that a claimant exhibit a “belief that is sincere and
190. For example, one person may consider a specific, isolated aspect of life
to be extremely important and filled with meaning so as to direct his or her life
path comprehensively, whereas another person may credit no importance or
breadth to such an idea at all.
191. Austin, supra note 141, at 25.
192. Id. at 23–25.
193. See discussion supra Part I.
194. See discussion supra Part I.
195. See discussion supra Part I.C.
196. Clements, supra note 68, at 552–53. Notably, Clements supports Judge
Adams’s comprehensiveness requirement, supplementing it with his “duties of
conscience” approach. Id. Conversely, this author advocates dropping the
comprehensiveness element but adopts the “duties of conscience” modification
of the ultimate concerns test. See id.
197. Id. at 551.
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meaningful [and] occupies a place in the life of its possessor
parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who
clearly qualifies for the exemption.”198 Nonetheless, without
actually clarifying the function of religious belief in the life of a
follower of a recognized religion, this definition falls short of
providing a usable approach.199
Furthermore, the subset of ideas that may qualify as ultimate
concerns—for example, a deep-seated conviction relating to a
particular political philosophy—is not necessarily consistent with
the class of ideas the religion clauses aim to address.200 Assuredly,
the Court’s primary concern in Seeger and Welsh was the
inviolability of conscience.201 The Court aimed to prevent the
intense psychological turmoil an adherent faces when forced to
choose between obeying the law or his conscience—not when
facing a conflict between the law and any question of great
meaning.202 Not all ultimate concerns necessarily qualify as
matters of conscience.203
Rather than labor with the inherent vagueness of the ultimate
concerns test as it stands, courts should focus on ideas that impart
to believers a duty of conscience—“a compelling sense of devotion
and duty.”204 Stated differently, duties of conscience would
incorporate Judge Adams’s notions of “the meaning of life and
death, man’s role in the Universe, and the proper moral code of
right and wrong,”205 while also achieving consistency with the
spirit of the Court’s conscience-oriented interpretation of the First
Amendment’s aims.206 In a more narrowly tailored fashion than the
198. Seeger v. U.S., 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965).
199. Clements, supra note 68, at 551–52.
200. Id. at 540–41.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. For example, vegetarianism for health-based reasons is a significant
life choice—an ultimate concern, even—but it does not impart duties of
conscience in the sense of addressing questions of right and wrong or moral
duty. On the other hand, veganism does impart a duty of conscience, insofar as it
espouses an animal-free diet in order for adherents to avoid animal cruelty.
About Veganism, VEGAN ACTION, http://www.vegan.org/about_veganism/index.
html (last visited Feb. 4, 2011).
204. Clements, supra note 68, at 553.
205. Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J.,
concurring).
206. James Madison viewed religion as “the duty which we owe to our
Creator.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 719 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments, in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183–191 (G.
Hunt ed. 1901)). The expansion of this idea to include beliefs not necessarily
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ultimate concerns test, such a definition protects the inviolability of
conscience that the Seeger and Welsh Courts aimed to preserve.207
Moreover, requiring ideas of questionable religious nature to relate
to duties of conscience in order to be considered constitutionally
religious is a test that more accurately captures the role that easily
recognized, clearly religious ideas play in the lives of individuals
and in society.
3. Maintaining the “External Signs and Formalities”
Requirement
Third, a useful yet non-determinative factor involves “formal,
external, or surface signs that may be analogized to accepted
religions.”208 In other words, rituals, hierarchies, holy texts,
ceremonial apparel, and other externally observable indications are
useful analogical tools for identifying religious character, even
though they are not necessary to such a finding.209 This factor
allows courts to consider and apply everyday, commonplace
notions of religion as it occurs in society.210
CONCLUSION
The Waldorf dispute provides a glimpse into the likely
future—a changing American religious and educational landscape,
which will give rise to cases that will inevitably call into question
the meaning and aims of the religion clauses of the Constitution.211
Ultimately, the particular facts of the Waldorf controversy—
Waldorf supporters’ insistence that the system’s roots in
anthroposophy and its teaching methods are spiritual yet nonreligious212—not only demonstrate significant state interests at
stake in defining religion but also suggest that courts in the future
should be able to apply a religious label to an entity in spite of its
denial of religiosity.213 In turn, the prevailing societal interests in
the Waldorf scenario add to the evidence supporting American
society’s need for a broad, unitary definition of religion—one that

related to a Creator or god reflects the Court’s protection of the individual
conscience. See also Clements, supra note 68, at 534 n.14.
207. See supra notes 125–30 and accompanying text.
208. Malnak, 592 F.2d at 209 (Adams, J., concurring).
209. Id.
210. Blutman, supra note 132, at § 3.2.
211. See supra notes 15–16, 180 and accompanying text.
212. See discussion supra Part I.C.
213. See discussion supra Part IV.
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gives adequate meaning and scope to both the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses.
In addition to maintaining an “external signs” factor, the
subtraction of Judge Adams’s “comprehensiveness” requirement
and the modification of the notion of ultimate concerns to reflect
“duties of conscience” allow for the broad protection of the
interests associated with both religion clauses.214 Such a definition
of religion also reflects the more commonly understood role of
religion in American society and uses reasonable limits to protect
against overinclusion. Lastly, this definitional approach allows for
flexibility in a continuously pluralizing society, providing a fair,
sufficiently inclusive playing field for individuals and groups that
continue to blur the existing boundaries of the legal definition of
religion.
Michael Rhea∗

214. The greatest significance of the Waldorf dispute does not lie in its
resolution; rather, the scenario more importantly foretells the manifestation of
similar factual situations in the future and emphasizes the need for a workable
definition of religion. Nonetheless, this author believes that, under the newly
proposed definition of religion, Waldorf schools and anthroposophy would
potentially earn religious classifications. Without having to meet a
comprehensiveness requirement, Waldorf schools and anthroposophy would
fulfill the “duties of conscience” factor because of the arguably moral
obligations that they impose upon an adherent’s conscience: a mission to avoid
profound misunderstandings and anti-social attitudes in order to become more
fully human. Moreover, the globally connected network of anthroposophy-based
organizations and the ritualistic, ceremonial characteristics of parts of Waldorf
education contribute to the external signs factor of the proposed test.
Nonetheless, a legitimate counterargument—which goes beyond the scope of
this paper—lies in the contention that strong moral suggestions are not
equivalent to imperative moral duties. Regardless of any preliminary assertions,
however, determining religiosity under the proposed test would ultimately
require a trier of fact to examine in detail the totality of relevant evidence.
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